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Contingency, Time, and the Theological Ambiguity
of Science
Willem B. Drees
1. Introduction
"The most miraculous thing is happening.... The physicists are
getting down to the nitty-gritty, they've really just about pared
things down to the ultimate details, and the last thing they ever
expected to happen is happening. God is showing through.
They hate it, but they can't do anything about it. Facts are facts.
And I don't think people in the religion business, so to speak,
are really aware of this—aware, that is, that their case, far-out as
it's always seemed, at last is being proven...."
"Mr. Köhler. What kind of God is showing through, ex-
actly?" (Dialogue between Dale Kohler, a computer freak, and
Roger, a divinity school professor, in Updike 1986)
Contingency and time are obviously important concepts for any
theology. Wolfhart Pannenberg has developed his own understanding
of these two concepts in his theology. The present paper is not an
analysis of Pannenberg's view. I discuss these concepts in relation to
cosmology (in the astrophysical sense). It will be argued that scientific
cosmology does not provide a basis for an inductive argument for God;
God is not showing through, nor ruled out. This ambiguity implies
that science does not offer a basis for a metaphysics which thematizes
God's presence, a 'mystical metaphysics'. However, one could use the
apparent absence of God as argument for a theology in which each
moment in time is confronted with an atemporal 'otherness'. I suggest
that it is important to develop such a 'prophetical metaphysics' in dia-
logue with scientific understandings of the world. The paper ends with
some tentative questions about Pannenberg's approach.'
Science is, as I will argue, neutral with respect to both contingency
and necessity (2.1). 'Complete theories' suggest necessity, but they are
based upon abstraction of diversity (2.2). The data used in 'anthropic
arguments' suggest global empirical contingency, and hence the need
for a theistic explanation. However, the discussion about anthropic
principles offers a variety of metaphysical options and does not
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support a 'design' argument for the existence of God (2.3). The 'mys-
tery of existence' is in itself beyond science. Such global ontological
contingency offers the possibility to see the universe as grace, but it
need not be interpreted that way (2.4).
Physical systems can be described from within time, as evolving.
However, they also allow for descriptions which consider whole histo-
ries at once (3.1). These two approaches offer opportunities for the-
ology, especially if they are combined together with an emphasis on
the present (3.2).
In the final section the conclusions will be related to a theology
which primarily thematizes God's absence (4). This leads to a view of
the relation between theology and the sciences which seems to be dif-
ferent from the way Pannenberg has argued for theologically relevant
dimensions in the facts (Pannenberg 1985, 19f; Chapter 2 of this vol-
ume) and certainly from the way Tipler has, in his contribution to this
volume, subsumed theology under science (Chapter 7). The paper
therefore ends with some questions about the way Pannenberg seems
to use contingency, time, and the sciences in general (5).
2. Contingency
R.J. Russell (1988) distinguishes global,2 local, and nomological contin-
gency. Within the first and second Russell considers ontological and
empirical contingency, say, the difference between the mystery of exis-
tence, why there should be a universe, and the specific way the uni-
verse is. Cosmology seems to relate to global empirical contingency
(2.2, 2.3), and perhaps also to global ontological contingency (2.4).
First, a general argument for the equal status of contingency and
necessity with respect to science will be presented (2.1).
2.1. Contingency and Necessity: Both Outside Science
Science works with a methodological principle of sufficient reason,
the guideline that one should always seek further reasons. Science
"could not abandon the presupposition that reasons can be given for
the properties or patterns things are found to have, without surrender-
ing its very character as a continuing and endless quest for such rea-
sons, and for continually better ways of expressing these reasons"
(Munitz 1974,105).
However, this methodological rule should be distinguished from
the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason, which states that there
must be such reasons, whether we can find them or not. This latter
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principle is outside the range of science, although it is supported by
the instances when science has been successful in its search for rea-
sons. Quantum physics might be interpreted as a branch of physics
where the metaphysical principle appears to be not valid.
The methodological principle of sufficient reason implies that con-
tingency is always outside science. Something which seems contin-
gent might be shown by future science to be unavoidable, given cer-
tain circumstances. And science attempts to show that those
circumstances are necessary as well. Science is a quest to remove con-
tingency as far as possible.
But science is in its practice also at odds with complete necessity.
In trying to explain everything science always traces properties or
events or rules back to other events, boundary conditions, or laws.
Certain rules are used in that process of explanation, laws of physics
and logical and mathematical rules. Even if the chain does not go
backwards in time, there is a chain of 'more fundamental' explana-
tions—explanations which are based on laws and boundary condi-
tions of wider applicability and greater simplicity.
Some cosmologists, like S.W. Hawking (1980), and some popular-
izers, like P.W. Atkins (1981) and H.R. Pagels (1985), have claimed that
science is near the end of the chain, providing an explanation on the
basis of the most simple principles. But it remains legitimate to ask,
Why those principles? Scientific work on complete and unified theories
is not wrong. But the claim that science offers the ultimate explanation,
and hence that the universe could only have been the way it actually is,
goes beyond science. The belief that we are close to a complete explana-
tion could nonetheless be justifiable, due to the success of a specific pro-
gram and the simplicity and elegance of the assumptions. The next sec-
tion will consider the attempt to construct complete theories of the
universe and hence to remove empirical global contingency. The conclu-
sion of this section is that both contingency and necessity are terms out-
side science; science does not in its method opt for the one or the other.
2.2. Unified Theories of Everything and Global Empirical
Contingency
Both the contingency of the initial conditions and the contingency
of the laws governing the universe are actually disputed among theo-
retical cosmologists and physicists.
Boundary Conditions and Laws
In standard cosmology, based upon Einstein's theory of general
relativity, it is possible that a three-dimensional space is finite but
220 Willen B Drees
without edges. Such a space is curved back into itself, just as the two-
dimensional surface of the Earth is finite without edges. Time is differ-
ent, even if the total duration is finite, in a closed universe from Big
Bang to a Big Crunch. Time remains like a line with a beginning and
an end.
The English cosmologist Stephen Hawking has in collaboration
with James Hartle extended the idea of a finite space without edges
to four dimensions, including something like time (Hawking 1982;
Hartle and Hawking 1983). The 'time' variable becomes, of course,
through such a procedure something quite different from our ordi-
nary concept of time. This proposal does away with arbitrary
boundary conditions for the universe; as Hawking stated, the
boundary condition of the universe is that it has no boundary.3 This
cosmology is just one of the many approaches at the frontier of
research. However, some other approaches also lack contingent
boundary conditions. For example, the Russian cosmologist Andrej
Linde envisages an eternal universe which is like a foam of bubbles.
Bubbles are more or less homogeneous regions like the observable
universe. As Linde has it, all possible bubbles exist; the universe is a
lunch at which all possible dishes are available (Linde 1983, 245). We
will come back to the presence of all possibilities below. It implies,
of course, that there is no choice needed for initial conditions—;they
all have been chosen.
Theoretical cosmology today needs particle physics and theories
about space and time, and hence about gravity as an effect of the cur-
vature of space-time. There is no satisfactory unified theory yet. How-
ever, there are certain proposals. There are three components in pres-
ent arguments for complete theories: mathematical consistency,
esthetics, and 'many worlds.'
Mathematical Consistency: The Problem of Infinities
Quantum physics is very successful. However, it has one problem,
aside from its interpretation: it predicts an infinite mass for electrons.
Humans would have an infinite mass as well, which is not in line with
observations. Theoretical physicists have a trick, renormalization; they
subtract infinity somewhere. This procedure can be defined rigorously
and it works. The resulting mass is, of course, not a prediction of the
theory but taken for granted. If the same trick would be needed over
and over again the theory would be useless; it would not predict any-
thing. A renormalizable theory is a theory which needs this trick only
once, while producing finite results in all subsequent calculations.
Quantum electrodynamics, the theory which describes electrons,
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positrons, and radiation, is such a renormalizable theory. It has been
tested and confirmed to a very high degree of accuracy.
Particle theories incorporating more of the known particles turned
out to be plagued by infinities. The Dutch physicist G. 't Hooft
showed in the early 1970s that only theories of a specific type were
renormalizable. Since, all particle theories have followed this path: the
Weinberg-Salam theory for the weak interactions, the quark theory,
and the Grand Unified Theories (GUTs), which integrate nuclear and
electromagnetic forces.
The requirement that infinities must be manageable in such a way
is rather restrictive. And still it seems artificial, a trick to brush the
problems under the rug. One step further would be a theory without
problems, one which predicts finite results for all possible observa-
tions. Finiteness for a theory4 is, surely, a stronger restriction than
renormalizability. And the restrictions become even more severe if the
theory has to include gravity as well. There are, as far as 1 know, no
theories for which it has been shown that they are finite in all circum-
stances. The best candidates today are superstring theories, and their
number is quite small. Six theories satisfy the known conditions of
consistency, and of those six, three are perhaps equivalent. More con-
ditions for consistency, that is, finiteness, might reduce the number of
consistent theories even more. "Ideally it will turn out that there is
only one" (Schwarz 1987,654).
It is assumed throughout that the laws can be formulated mathe-
matically. There might be other assumptions taken for granted, like
Tipler's assumption about continuity until the end of time for rela-
tivistic space-times (above, 163). Such assumptions might introduce an
a posteriori component. But the claim that there is, independent of any
observation, only a very limited set of mathematically consistent theo-
ries deserves to be taken seriously.
Simplicity and Esthetics
There are variants of Einstein's theory of general relativity which
are compatible with observations as they stand today. Nonetheless,
they are not considered to be as good as Einstein's theory. These judg-
ments are based on such criteria as coherence, simplicity, and ele-
gance. Similar judgments are made with respect to more recent cosmo-
logical theories. Esthetic and metaphysical arguments are present in
the criteria for theory evaluation. Even disregarding the requirement
of consistency, accepting such criteria might reduce the number of
possible initial conditions and laws within the not-too-distant future,
perhaps even to only one package.5
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All Possibilities Present
Linde imagines the universe as consisting of mini-universes, bub-
bles "of all possible types" (Linde 1983, 627). In Hawking's view all
possibilities which are part of the quantum description of the universe
are equally present. Tïpler defends a third type of cosmology, but he
too adhers to a many-worlds interpretation of quantum theories
(above, 174). Tipler makes a distinction which seems useful: he opts
for the actual existence of all classical possibilities represented in a
quantum wave function, but allows for contingency on the set of all
possible wave functions (176).
The actuality of all possibilities, in one way or another, implies
that an explanation does not need to claim that certain features are the
only possible outcome of the preceding processes. It is sufficient if
those features are possible, for then they will be realized somewhere.
Without this assumption we would be left with an incompleteness, as
the theory would not specify which possibility is the actual one. How-
ever, the assumption is not a sufficient one to remove all contingency,
since the presence of all possibilities is always the presence of all pos-
sibilities of a certain theory. The question remains: Why one theory and
not another? This question might be answered by the appeal to consis-
tency, in other words, finiteness, and to esthetic criteria like simplicity.
The Teilhard boundary condition proposed by Tipler (an Omega
point) and the Hartle-Hawking boundary (compactness) are such
additional assumptions, defensible by reference to esthetic, metaphysi-
cal, and perhaps even religious criteria. As Tipler has it, all the contin-
gency in quantum cosmology is in the boundary conditions which
pick out the wave function which actually exists (178).
Diversity in Nature: The Many
There is one general objection against the expectation of a simple
complete theory: our world is so complex. Could a complete theory be
fair to that complexity, or would it only be complete due to a great
amount of abstraction—leaving many of the particular characteristics
of our world outside its scope? That has been argued by the English
philosopher of science Mary Hesse (1988), and by the physicist Free-
man Dyson (1988). The study of complex systems, for instance
weather prediction, is also a respectable branch of science. Two catch-
words in recent developments are chaos and fractals.6
Unity and Diversity, Perennial Problems
Dualities like unity and diversity, universality and particularity,
the general and the specific, and the One and the Many, are present in
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different fields of thought. Dualities, of course, pervade also other
areas of life, like politics and family life.
The problem with 'complete theories' is not that they do away
with contingency, and thus would make a transcendent God superflu-
ous. The problem is that they might go with values which overempha-
size unity and neglect the particular. Somehow both unity and diver-
sity should be part of a satisfactory view of the world.
Three elements of the Christian tradition might be useful in this
context. The particular person Jesus became understood as the Christ,
with universal significance. The idea of the Trinity combines unity and
diversity in God. And the doctrine of creation is helpful, as it locates
the unity in the transcendent creator, while allowing for diversity in
the created world.
Theologians should accept that there is progress in theoretical
physics and cosmology towards a very limited number of encompass-
ing unified theories. These theories are, however, not really threats to
an emphasis on contingency, as they are only possible due to abstrac-
tion of features of particulars. The specific topic in the framework of
such cosmologies is not contingency, but unity and diversity. Christian
theology needs to express both unity and the value of particulars.
2.3. Anthropic Principles and Global Empirical Contingency?
Standard cosmology assumes what is called the Copernican prin-
ciple: we humans do not occupy a priviliged position in space. The
last few years there have been rumors about something special for us,
anthropic principles. R.J. Russell (1988) suggested the anthropic prin-
ciples as thematization of global contingency. Others have used the
underlying data, which I call 'anthropic coincidences', in arguments
for the existence of God. I will argue that this does not work as argu-
ment either for the existence of God or for the cosmological signifi-
cance of humans. The Weak Anthropic Principle is true but irrelevant.
The stronger anthropic principles are themselves disputable meta-
physical principles, not consequences of science. They, as well as the
anthropic coincidences, might be used to express contingency, but
they certainly do not support a strong statement about the contin-
gency of the universe, and hence lack inductive apologetic value.
There are two basic types of anthropic principles, the Weak
Anthropic Principle and the strong anthropic principles. They use the
same data, which might be called anthropic coincidences.
The Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP) states that what we see must
be compatible with our existence. We see a universe with planets,
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since we depend on planets. We see a universe which exists for some
billions of years, as it took billions of years to develop beings which
are capable of thinking about the age of the universe. It has the nature
of a selection rule: our observations are biased in favor of situations
where we exist.
The Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP) can be stated as: "The Uni-
verse must have those properties which allow life to develop within it
at some stage in its history" (Barrow and Tipler 1986, 21). This is not a
statement about what we actually observe but about the class of possi-
ble universes.7 There are different ways to argue for this principle.
One has been given by the physicist J.A. Wheeler when he related the
existence of the universe to the existence of observers in the universe.
This particular version has been called the Participatory Anthropic Prin-
ciple (PAP).
Anthropic Coincidences and Weak Anthropic Explanations
1. The universe is enormous in size when compared to human
dimensions, even when compared with the human enterprise that
reaches the farthest: space travel. And its age is more than a million
times a typical age of a human civilization. This might result in feel-
ings of insignificance, as forcefully expressed in the story The Restau-
rant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams. He describes a terri-
ble machine which destroys the soul by making one see the whole
infinity of creation and oneself in relation to it. The effectiveness of
this machine shows that "if life is going to exist in a universe of this
size, then the one thing it cannot afford to have is a sense of propor-
tion" (Adams 1982, 71).
However, other things being equal, the age and size of the uni-
verse might be related to our existence. We need certain types of
atoms, like carbon and oxygen, which are produced in previous genera-
tions of stars. Biological evolution took another couple of billions of
years to produce complex, intelligent, observing, and goal-seeking
beings—us.
Turning this description upside down, it is argued that intelligent
observation by natural beings is only possible after some billions of
years, say ten billion. Thus, such beings can only observe a universe
which is at least ten billion years old. Along this line, WAP offers an
'explanation' for the observed age of the universe. Such a universe
must then also have a size of ten billion light years in all directions.
2. We happen to experience our world as having three spatial
dimensions as well as one time dimension. Anthropic reasoning seems
to rule out other dimensionalities. Two-dimensional beings would fall
apart if there would be a canal running through the body, say for
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digestion or blood circulation. In higher dimensional worlds planetary
orbits would be unstable.
A survey of, and contribution to, similar arguments for various
aspects of the initial conditions and the laws applying to our universe
is Barrow and Tipler 1986.
Evaluation of the Weak Anthropic Principle
The Weak Anthropic Principle is in itself true but devoid of relevance.
Take the following (simplified) example:
1. Assume that we know that life depends on liquid water.
2. We observe the existence of life, for instance ourselves.
3. WAP then predicts that our environment, our planet, will have a
surface temperature between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius. This
explains the temperature at our planet.
This is no explanation. There is no reason to call the WAP a 'prin-
ciple'. It is the common use of evidence: we observe A (life, 2), we
know that A and B go together (1, life needs liquid water), and hence
C (3, the environment must support the presence of liquid water). This
does not explain why, in my example, there are living beings and
planets with the right temperatures, nor does it explain why A and B
go together. The anthropic reasoning only repeats the first assump-
tion: the two go together. The argument is not wrong. But it is devoid
of relevance.
The existence of a paper explains some knowledge about the
world, since it points to an author with certain ideas. But that does not
justify the retrograde reasoning for the events, as if the existence of the
paper explains the birth of the author, or even the origin of his/her
ideas. There is a fundamental difference between an explanation for
one's knowledge and an explanation of the phenomena.
WAP with Many Worlds
The Weak Anthropic Principle may explain observations if it is
combined with the assumption that there are 'many worlds', regions
which are different with respect to the relevant property. It does not
explain the existence of the worlds, or of the observers, but as a selec-
tion rule it expresses that the observers will observe a 'world' with
this particular property. The interesting issue, however, is not the
selection rule (WAP), but the existence of the many worlds, hence the
metaphysical view about the actual and the possible. If one has an
extremely large number of monkeys typing for some time there will
be one typing flawlessly one of Pannenberg's books—as well as many
more typing a book almost flawlessly. However, this does not explain
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the typing monkeys (the many worlds), nor the possibility and proba-
bility of the event.
The Strong Anthropic Principles
The strong anthropic principles state that any possible universe
must have the properties for life (or for observing life). This is a state-
ment about the class of all possible universes. This leads to an expla-
nation of properties of the universe in terms of purpose: a property
that is necessary for life is necessary for a universe. However, it does
not need to refer to a purpose beyond the universe or the significance
of life; the relation between Hvability and existence might have a natu-
ral basis and life might be a kind of side-effect.8
Strong anthropic arguments have some disadvantages.
1. Properties of possible universes which are not actual are untestable.
If the possibilities are actual as other domains within a single uni-
verse, these domains are larger than the observable universe. If all
possible universes co-exist in a fuzzy reality, as the Many Worlds
Interpretation of quantum theories holds, any observation is in a
specific branch, and does not give access to the other branches.
Strong anthropic reasoning cannot rely on testable consequences
about the class of possible universes (or of domains within a uni-
verse). Its appeal must be based upon the coherence of the view
which it supports.
2. Anthropic arguments are quite restrictive in their predictions about
possible universes, if 'life' is taken to be 'life as we know it'. How-
ever, life is in its richness only partly understood. This is even more
the case for consciousness. To explain properties of the universe by
reference to life or consciousness is like the lame and the blind
guiding each other. Besides, other forms of life might develop in
zillions of years in completely different stages of the universe, or
other forms of life might be possible in other possible universes.
3. SAP explanations are also vulnerable to the future development of
scientific theories. Subsequent theories have, in general, fewer and
fewer unexplained parameters. As we saw above, some scientists
are searching for a complete theory, perhaps even one without any
arbitrary parameters—without invoking any reference to the neces-
sary existence of life. If they succeed the set of consistent possible
universes would contain only one element.
4. If applied at a small scale, for example by asserting that 'planets
must have the properties which allow for the development of life in
some stage of their history', a strong anthropic principle is surely
wrong. But the example shows the nature of the SAP. It is like the
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old teleological arguments: everything must have a function, and
therefore the moon must be populated, as the ancient philosopher
Plutarchus argued (Raingard 1934).
If one makes the metaphysical assumption that the existence of
humans, or at least of embodied consciousness, is the purpose of uni-
verses, the Strong Anthropic Principle follows. We would be the pur-
pose of it all, the universe would be for our sake. However, one could
also understand the Strong Anthropic Principle by assuming a creator
who likes complex toys. In such a view a universe would not exist for
the sake of life, or for some destiny of life, but for the sake (glory) of
God.
To conclude on SAP: its truth is disputable, and its interpretation
ambiguous.
A version of strong anthropic reasoning which seems more based
on science is the Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP), which was
introduced by Wheeler (Wheeler 1977; 1982; Patton and Wheeler
1975). It builds upon the interpretation of quantum theories. Quantum
theory describes a superposition of states. However, we do not
observe such superpositions. One of the proposed solutions for this
tension is that the act of observation makes reality definite. But what
is an observation? A measurement apparatus would still be, in prin-
ciple, subject to a quantum theoretical description in terms of a super-
position. Some, including Wheeler, have pursued this line to the
moment where consciousness comes in. PAP assumes that it is obser-
vation by conscious beings which gives reality to all the preceding
stages. If this interpretation is applied to the universe and if the uni-
verse is subject to a quantum-theoretical description, the conclusion is
that a universe needs to develop conscious beings who observe the
early universe. Otherwise it would not come into existence.
This view is based upon a sound knowledge of quantum theory, a
disputed, but not necessarily wrong, interpretation of quantum
mechanics, and a preference for the question of the origin of the uni-
verse above the question about the difference between an observer
and an observed system. Unclear are the characteristics needed to
qualify as an observer. "Was the world wave function waiting for mil-
lions of years until a single-celled creature appeared? Or did it have to
wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer—with a
Ph.D.?" (Bell 1981, 610). Besides, it suggests that regions of the uni-
verse where there are such observers are different from regions where
there aren't. Although that need not imply observable differences, it
still seems a bit odd.
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The Participatory Anthropic Principle might easily be picked
up in a metaphysics which gives 'mind in the universe' priority over
matter.
Anthropic Principles and Divine Design
If one takes the anthropic coincidences seriously but rejects the
'explanations' based upon the Participatory or the Strong Anthropic
Principle, one might opt for a theistic explanation: The universe
exhibits those coincidences which allow for life because it was
designed that way by a creator. In such discussions two ideas are jux-
taposed: either design, and hence God as an explanation, or many
worlds with a WAP explanation for the properties of our world. John
Polkinghorne, a professor of theoretical physics who became an Angli-
can priest, called the ideas about other worlds metaphysical specula-
tions. He holds the theistic explanation to be of equal intellectual
respectability and of greater economy and elegance (Polkinghorne
1986, 80).
This inductive-apologetic defense of God's reality does not work.
1. The argument assumes that the anthropic coincidences are here to
stay. However, these features which apparently point to design
might find ordinary scientific explanations in future theories. That
has happened for the traditional design arguments based on intra-
cosmic adaptedness. The inflationary scenario already led to some
erosion of anthropic coincidences.
2. Besides, the apologetics need a low plausibility of a plurality of
worlds (domains, universes) on which the Weak Anthropic Princi-
ple would work as a selection principle. As Montefiore, the Angli-
can bishop of Birmingham, states, "it is infinitely more complex
insofar as it postulates an infinite number of universes" (Monte-
fiore 1985, 38). This is a widespread objection against theories
which work with a plurality of 'worlds'. It appeals to a philosophi-
cal rule of economy, ascribed to William of Ockham: one should not
introduce more entities than necessary to explain the phenomena.
This is a misapplication of the economy rule. The many worlds
are not introduced 'by hand'. Take, again, the example of planetary
systems. The standard theory explains planets as remnants of an
original cloud which collapsed to form a star. This theory works
well for our solar system and fits with our knowledge about stars
and their formation. It seems more complex, more ad hoc to reject
the possibility of other planetary systems, although perhaps not
observed, than to accept their existence. It would need an addition-
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al rule if one would accept this theory of planetary formation and
reject the possibility of other planetary systems.
It is simpler to accept a theory that also makes predictions
beyond the observable domain than to draw a line. The issue of sim-
plicity is not about the number of entities predicted by a theory but
about the structure of the theory. Does a theory need more separate
rules to have those entities or to exclude them? Some cosmologica]
theories are more simple if one allows for the existence of many
domains. Simplicity is not a simple count of entities: one creator or
many universes.
This is not to conclude that belief in a Creator is wrong, nor that all
possibilities of a theory should exist. But this way of doing the apologetic
job does not work. We need to take more seriously the idea of more
worlds as well as the possibility of more complete scientific theories.
2.4. Global Ontological Contingency and the Universe
as Grace
Even the ontological contingency, the mystery of existence, has
been disputed by some cosmologists, but this one seems nonetheless
unassailable.
Hawking and Hartle interpreted their own proposal for the wave
function of the universe as giving the probability "for the universe to
appear from Nothing" (Hartle and Hawking 1983, 2961). Similar
claims have been made for other quantum theories of gravity, for
instance by Vilenkin.
I maintain that they do not describe an 'appearance out of noth-
ing' if the nothing is taken to be as absolute as imaginable.9 It is pos-
sible to interpret the Hartle-Hawking proposal in the sense of creatio ex
nihilo (creation out of nothing), if that is understood not as a cosmogo-
nie (temporal) description but as a view of the universe as being sus-
tained by God at every moment.
The notion of appearance is a temporal notion. The nothing arises
in the Hartle-Hawking theory through a timeless kind of calculation,
which does away with a reference to an earlier state as an initial con-
dition. Expressions like 'tunneling from nothing' are of a mixed
nature, and not suitable to describe the basic idea of this theory. Tun-
neling connotes a temporal process, while the 'from nothing' applies
to a kind of time-independent actuality.
The 'nothing' which has a precise meaning in the context of this
proposal is not an absolute 'nothing' in a more philosophical sense.
There are serious problems when one tries to combine the language of
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mental events which have the property of becoming and physical
events without that property? Unless one also holds that there is no
becoming in the mind—but why is the illusion so persistent? If one
opts for an objective, mind-independent view, one needs to face the
question whether that can be made part of the physical description.
This question of the flow of time is often mixed up with the
issues of order, a linear order relation, and asymmetry between the
past direction and the future direction. However, an order relation
seems necessary, but is not sufficient—we do not perceive anything
flowing along the line representing the real numbers; a present is
necessary for the notion of a flow of time. Besides, time asymmetry is
neither sufficient nor necessary. In an asymmetric process all
moments qualify as potential presents; there is no way to single out a
present as our present. And in purely reversible systems, say a fric-
tionless pendulum, we still have the impression that there is a pres-
ent position, which immediately is superseded by another present
position.
Events in the past seem necessary and fixed in memories, while
events in the future seem contingent. It has been attempted to use this
modal difference to formulate a distinction between the past of the
present moment and its future and hence an objective notion of the
present. Reichenbach (1971) appealed to quantum mechanics, where
the present is the moment processes become determined. However,
Grünbaum (1971) showed that every moment of time satisfies
Reichenbach's definition. It does not single out a unique moment as
the present present. The modal distinction between past and future
cannot "be reformulated into a physical discourse so as to allow a
physically significant distinction between past, present and future"
(Kroes 1985,200).
Physics seems unable to catch the present:
In my opinion, it is doubtful whether the attempts to construct
an objective theory of time flow have any chance of success. In
studying physical reality, physicists concentrate upon reducible
phenomena, and they eliminate all that makes the phenomenon
unique. In particular, they abstract from the fact that an event
takes place 'here' and 'now'. But whereas physics generally tries
to describe the universal aspects of the phenomena, the goal of
an objective theory of time flow is precisely to get hold of the
unique: such theory must single out a unique moment of time
as the present which separates the past from the future. There-
fore, it is in principle questionable whether an objective theory
of time flow is feasible. (Kroes 1985,208)
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The Whole of Time/Timelessness
One could compare a universe to a film—each single picture rep-
resenting a three-dimensional universe at a certain moment. Either
one can take the perspective of the viewer who sees all the pictures
subsequently in time, and hence sees action, movement, "evolution";
or from the perspective of the manufacturer, who handles the whole
film as a single entity, for instance in selling or storing. The film still
has a 'story', but there is no movement, no action or 'evolution'.
There is a similar feature of physical descriptions, which allows
for two descriptions.12 General relativity, the theory behind Big Bang
cosmology, has as its most fundamental entity a four-dimensional
space-time. That level of description is like having the whole film: all
moments are equally present, there is nothing like flow or movement.
It is often possible to decompose such a four-dimensional description
in a description of three-dimensional spaces evolving in time (Misner,
Thome, and Wheeler 1973).
Physical theories as different as Newton's mechanics, thermo-
dynamics, and quantum theories have been formulated in terms of
phase space and trajectories. Each trajectory represents a complete
possible 'history' of a system. At this level of description, the theory is
not about an evolving system, say the movement of a particle, but
about whole histories.
Light takes the fastest path from a source to a receiver. In a homo-
geneous medium this is a straight line. However, if there is, for
instance, a transition from air to water, the fastest path is not straight
but broken. One very useful description is in terms of all possible
paths, in combination with a selection rule (principle of least action)
that indicates which path is actually taken. As before, the physical
description works with complete 'possible histories'. Such principles
of least action are very pervasive in physics. This idea has been incor-
porated in the path-integral formalism, which is extensively used in
contemporary field theory (particle physics). It seems as if the
more 'holistic' pictures of theories about whole histories imply
determinism—one can only sell complete films once they are complete.
However, selling is an action in time, and hence once again brings in
the other type of description. The timeless perspective, without claim-
ing to have the final perspective of one's world at a certain moment of
time, does not imply determinism. This can be explained as follows:
A universe picture is, according to McCall (1976), a complete
description of a history of a universe, including past, present, and
future. Assuming that the past is fixed and the future is a set of possi-
bilities, a universe picture at a certain moment is like a tree: one stem
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(fixed past) and many branches (future possibilities). The present of a
universe picture is the point where the branching begins. McCall
hopes to formulate an objective flow of time in terms of such trees, as
later trees are subtrees of earlier trees. That, however, does not single
out a unique tree as corresponding to the present (Kroes 1985, 203f).
One can talk about the whole set of trees, hence possible universe
pictures, without implying that the future is determined or even
already should have happened—as is necessary for having the com-
plete film. Of course, having the 'last' tree of a series—which would
consist only of stem without branches—would mean that everything
were fixed relative to the present defined by that tree, but then every-
thing is in the past. Talking about systems in terms of such trees pro-
vides a language for talking about complete histories without imply-
ing determinism. Determinism is, of course, a feature of some basic
physical theories which can be formulated in this 'complete-history'
way, like classical mechanics, general relativity, and Tipler's cosmolo-
gy. But that does not warrant the reverse argument, that such a time-
less description is necessarily tied up with determinism.
Both the difficulties in giving a physical expression of the flow of
time and the presence from a timeless perspective aside from the
description from within time imply that one cannot appeal to modern
cosmology and physics for support of the claim that we live in a
dynamic, evolutionary world. However, the conclusion need not be
only negative; the existence of two descriptions might also offer
opportunities to express certain theological concerns.
3.2. Theology: Time and Timelessness in Relation
to the Present
Almost all current theologians who take science seriously opt for a
dynamic picture. When the physical view of time is discussed, there is
a strong emphasis on the flow of time and the asymmetry of time. The
whole of time has been discussed as a problem, where theology
should hope for the right outcome. This is especially true for process
theologians (such as Griffin 1986), but also for others (for instance
Russell 1984).
Philosophical theology and theoretical science take some distance
from commonsense experience. At that level both descriptions might
be useful. They allow for different clusters of associations, and thereby
help one to see the world differently. The precise meaning of all the
terms is dependent upon the further system in which the ideas partici-
pate.
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A description within time takes history and evolution as basic. This
resonates with a theological emphasis on Heilsgeschichte (salvation his-
tory). Creatio ex nihilo is most easily associated with questions about
ultimate origins, cosmogony. Creatio continua deals with God's relation
to the processes of change, especially to the emergence of novelty.
Contingency is primarily about events; future events might still be
contingent. Necessity seems reflected in the laws, which are the same
for all moments in time, and in the unavoidability of a temporal
dimension. Value is easily related to the future; decisions will be
judged by their consequences. The eschaton, say the Kingdom of God,
is closely related to the future. God's relation to the world is most easily
formulated in terms of immanence or temporal transcendence (e.g.,
before the world, luring towards a better future).
The perspective that incorporates the whole of time might be
understood as a view sub specie aeternitatis, a 'bird's-eye view' of the
whole of history. Creatio ex nihilo is not about origins, but about the
ground of everything. (For an atemporal understanding of ground
one could think of the role of axioms in a mathematical system.
They are not prior in a temporal sense, but they are the ground of
the system.) Creatio continua might express God's conservatie. How-
ever, it is stripped from the emphasis on change and novelty, which
it has in the other perspective. 'Novelty' is not a concept that fits in
this timeless perspective; it belongs to the other language. Time is
explicitly seen as part of the created order. Contingency is primarily
the ontological kind: Why is there anything at all? Besides, the con-
tingency of the laws is more explicit: Why this package and not
another? The events are less seen as contingent: they are all neces-
sary relative to the whole of history. Value must be understood as
being there for every event, just by being part of the whole web—or
perhaps even more primitively, just by being. Eschatology is less
connected with the future, and more with God's transcendence.
Transcendence is less easily understood as temporal (before and
after the world); rather it is a radical beyond—as if in a completely
different dimension.
Each of these two views is in danger of missing something essen-
tial. The perspective incorporating the whole of time might result in a
conservative, status quo-affirming, understanding of eternal values—
and thus divert the attention from the concrete contexts of injustice
and suffering to the 'other place' of an eternal and timeless faith. The
other, evolutionary, view is in danger of subsuming the present suffer-
ing and injustice under the future happiness, and thus of becoming an
optimistic expectation of 'another time'.
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They both gain strength, from a theological perspective, if they are
tied to the present. The present is the place in which the temporal and
the atemporal intersect critically. One might well relate the two clus-
ters of associations to two types of Biblical literature. The prophetical
literature is in the middle of time, influencing what is going on. Wis-
dom literature reflects on the way things are, will be, and apparently
always have been. However, they need each other. Prophetical criti-
cism appeals to God's otherness or transcendence—that is, its
Archimedean perspective to criticize the present.
This atemporal transcendence, and the correlated view of the
whole of time, might be useful as an understanding of God. A view
sub specie aeternitatis is not one that can be attained definitely. But it
can express the aim of "an understanding of the affairs of men which
is not relative to the outlook of an individual, community or age", not
even "relative to the outlook of mankind" (Sutherland 1984, 88). The
idea functions like the transcendental regulative ideas of reason, as
directing the understanding towards a certain goal. The unattaina-
biliry, the transcendence, is essential. It is sane to allow for self-
questioning in relation to a perspective other than one's own. If this
'other perspective' would be accessible, like a list of eternal values, it
would become an expression of insanity, of fanaticism without self-
questioning. "What is at stake in this argument is not the content of
faith, but, as Kierkegaard stressed, the manner of appropriation of
faith. Faith must be appropriated in a way which distinguishes it from
fanaticism. For that it requires the idea of the eternal which transcends
even one's most cherished views" (Sutherland 1984,110).
The statement that God is eternal can be understood in two ways:
• God is everlasting, hence God has an unending duration.
• God is timeless, has no duration.
Pike discusses the second option in his God and Timetessness (1970).
Pike concludes that the concept of timelessness has almost no scrip-
tural basis; it arises from Platonic influence. "I shall not conclude that
the doctrine of timelessness should not be included in a system of
Christian theology. Instead, I shall close with a question: What reason
is there for thinking that a doctrine of God's timelessness should have
a place in a system of Christian theology?" (Pike 1970,190).
Timelessness might have a place for two reasons.
1. Time is part of the created order. This is Augustine's view of creatio
cum tempore, and seems a reasonable interpretation of most contem-
porary cosmologies. Hence, it is not meaningful to talk about God
as everlasting as if there was time before the creation.
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2. The presence of a timeless description, where the whole is a unit
including all moments, suggests that it is possible to talk about the
relation of God to this whole—and not God at one moment to the
universe at that moment, differentiating moments in God.
God's transcendence as timelessness does not exclude that there is
an order, and perhaps even a flow, within God which could be
labelled God's time.
4. Science and Theology: About God's Presence or
God's Absence?
In the introduction 1 distinguished between a metaphysics which
thematizes God's presence and one which thematizes God's absence.
If God's presence is the starting point, the divine reality is somehow
"showing through" in our ordinary reality. A religion along this line
could be called mystical; the aim is to establish contact with that
divine reality. It suggests the possibility of an inductive apologetic
argument from science to theology.
The theme of God's absence suggests a contrast between the divine
and ordinary reality. It therefore leads to a prophetic emphasis: judg-
ment (it is not as it should be ideally) and appeal to conversion
(change this world by orienting ourselves to the divine reality).
These two approaches result in different questions in the dialogue
with the sciences. The 'mystical' approach would be more interested
in the intelligibility of the traditional metaphysical attributes of God in
the context of contemporary understanding. Tipler's paper is a clear
example. When he raises the question whether his God of the Omega
Point is the God, Tipler takes necessary existence as the criterion par
excellence (159). The 'prophetical' approach might emphasize the
function of any understanding of God: whether it allows humans to
perceive their own reality more critically, and to do something about it
whenever it is judged to be on the wrong course.
If the reality of God is somehow complementary to ours, the
divine complement is expected to be reflected in a cognitive incom-
pleteness of any understanding which leaves it out. Consonance is
expected between the way the divine reality is and the way the world
is. If descriptive consonance is lacking for a specific theology and a
specific scientific understanding of the world, one has to doubt either
the theology or the science. Although they espouse different theolo-
gies, it seems that it is primarily this approach which is followed by
those who emphasized a 'critical realist' understanding of science and
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of theology, like Barbour (1974), Peacocke (1984), Soskice (1985), and
Polkinghorne (1986).
As argued above (section 2), contingency does not provide a basis
for an argument for the existence of God. Science is neutral with
respect to contingency and necessity. Contingency is not ruled out by
complete theories, but it is not supported by anthropic coincidences
either. Generalizing, there are good reasons to doubt whether a cogni-
tive argument on the basis of science for the necessity of a divine re-
ality can be based upon contemporary science. Even the global onto-
logical contingency allows for different stances, either taking the
universe as a simple brute fact or ascribing it to a transcendent cause.
There is no support from science for a divine reality which is some-
how present as complement to our world.
As the cognitive inductive argument fails, one could appeal to
revelation, or inner experience, or anything outside the public dis-
course. However, such a fideistic option is not attractive for those who
want to do their theology in dialogue with science. Theology, as Pan-
nenberg defends, poses universal claims, and should defend these in
the public sphere (see Chapter 2 of this volume).13
Theologians seem to be caught between the ambiguity of inner-
worldly evidence, as the information provided by the sciences does
not offer a decisive clarity about the existence of God, and the need for
a public account for one's convictions. I suggest that, instead of trying
to resolve the ambiguity within the scientific realm, 'the God hypothe-
sis' might be introduced precisely in that context.
It seems that modern science shares in the ambivalence of modern
life-experiences: we would like to have meaning, but do not really
find it. In the face of the apparent meaninglessness and irrationality of
the world, there seem to be three possible positions.14
First, some argue that the meaninglessness is only apparent. If one
would open one's eyes, meaning would be perceived as really there.
Such a position seems to me a major current in the New Age move-
ment; the "crisis is essentially a crisis of perception" (Capra 1983,
xviii); we are on the brink of a reenchantment of the world (Herman
1981). Although with a different metaphysical view, those who defend
the complementary nature of the divine reality also suggest that
meaning is really there; the absence exists only in a narrow, reductive
perspective on the ordinary world. Others accept the world as mean-
ingless; religion is perceived as a great denial of this pointlessness.
Might it not be possible to argue a third course between those two
positions by introducing the hypothesis of a transcendent God as a
conjecture about meaning for this world without denying the reality
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of its irrationality. This leads to a theology which starts from the expe-
rience of God's absence. This corresponds to an understanding of the
divine reality as, primarily, different from our ordinary world. Philo-
sophical theology becomes primarily reflection upon injustice in this
world, upon values, upon activities against injustice, and upon ways
to live with failures and losses. The confrontation with the natural sci-
ences seems less relevant for such a theology with its human-centered,
and perhaps even political, emphasis. However, such theologies too
go with metaphysical views.
The preceding proposal might be misunderstood as one more in
the anti-realistic camp. It portrays God as a merely subjective notion,
useful in some language games and dispensable in others. However, I
hold our knowledge to be unavoidably hypothetical, but nonetheless
purporting to refer to something real. This view differs from that of
the 'critical realists' not because it does not intend to be critical or to be
about a reality; but because it accepts that there is no warrant for an
approximate correspondence between our conjectures and the reality
they purport to describe. If evil is really evil and injustice in this world
is not illusory, any proposal for meaning is just that: a proposal, a con-
jecture about the possibility of a better world, or this world better,
'dreaming of peace'. The constructive nature is not only a limitation of
our knowledge; it reflects the nature of the theological enterprise in an
imperfect world.
If one accepts the ambiguity of science one cannot avoid that
God's reality remains a conjecture. However, once this assumption is
introduced, one should explicate and develop its meaning in an intel-
ligible way, and hence in terms which fit our contemporary scientific
understanding. We construct our metaphysical understanding of
God.15 Its adequacy will be judged by its harmony with the scientific
understanding of the world and by the way it is a suitable meta-
physics for the primary existential reason for the introduction of the
hypothesis God: it should provide a framework which makes it pos-
sible to live and act in an imperfect and unjust world. Such a meta-
physics should allow for a theology which is primarily prophetical,
aimed at critical relativizing of the present status quo and evoking a
response. Such a theology needs a difference between what is possible
and what is actual. The future is one which we make, not one which is
definitely enfolded in the cosmic process. Theological adequacy
requires an emphasis on the present, instead of some 'other time' or
'other place', and on evocation instead of the promise of a happy end-
ing. The present is where we live, and where our acts can make a dif-
ference; to make a difference assumes that the future is not determined.
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God can be understood primarily as transcendence related to the
present. It is in the present that the inner-cosmic temporal dimension
(our acts with respect to the immediate future) is confronted with the
atemporal. God is atemporally transcendent, a metaphysical principle
of contrast, of otherness, but God is such in relation to each present.
There are, at least, three aspects of such an understanding of God.
1. God would be the location of values, which provide the basis for
judgement. Locating the values in God seems fitting for three rea-
sons, aside from fitting the prophetic criticism of the present state
as not being according to God's vision, (a) Values are abstract, and
in that sense eternal. They bring the non situational into the moral
deliberations concerning a specific situation, (b) God is perfect and
just, the fundamental nonmoral and moral values understood to be
sought for in eschatology. (c) God is beyond our grasp. We cannot
appropriate the ultimate values as if we know them exhaustively.
Fanaticism which does not allow for the possibility of being wrong
does not fit.
2. God would be the locus of possibilities. The past is that which was;
however, in God there is the contrast of that which could have
been. The future will still be one course among the many possibili-
ties; the possibilities metaphysically precede the actual single
future. This assumes that there are the alternatives for our actions,
and hence that an understanding of theology as being after judg-
ment and evocation is meaningful.
3. God is also transcendent as the source of reality, as its eternal
ground. This latter component is not an affirmation about a remote
destiny but about our present lives. Affirming the goodness,
despite evidence of imperfection, may contribute to the overcoming
of anxiety.
5. Questions Concerning Pannenberg's Approach
The thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg on the issues of contingency and
time, as well as on method and God's presence and absence, is exten-
sive. The following are some very rough impressions, which might
well be mistaken. Hence, the questions might be understood more as a
request for further clarification than as a definitive criticism.
Pannenberg seems to relate science and theology cognitively in
two ways, which could be labelled inductive and deductive. Both
reflect his interest in the universality of theological claims.
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1. An inductive-apologetic approach is most clearly present in his
anthropological writings.16 Secular anthropology needs a religious
dimension. This dimension correlates to an external reality.
2. Deduction from theology to claims about the world is more explicit
in discussions about physics and biology. For example, "the theo-
logical affirmation that the world of nature proceeds from an act of
divine creation implies the claim that the existence of the world as a
whole and of all its parts is contingent" (Pannenberg 1993b, 34). It
is this stance which allows for "theological questions to scientists"
(Chapter 1, above). It also bears upon the nature of science. "If the
God of the Bible is creator of the universe, then it is not possible to
understand fully or even appropriately the processes of nature
without reference to that God." (38)
God is cognitively necessary; the sciences are incomplete (the
inductive approach) and must be incomplete (deductively seen from
theology). If "nature can be appropriately understood without refer-
ence to the God of the Bible, then that God cannot be the creator of the
universe, and consequently he would not be truly God and could not
be trusted as a source of moral teaching either" (38).
The question is how this relates to the discussion of contingency
as given above. How about the equal absence from physics of contin-
gency and necessity, as Pannenberg asks what modern physics has to
say about contingency (1993b, 35). How about his response to the
search for complete unified cosmological theories? How about the
ambiguity of the contingency as reflected in the anthropic coinci-
dences? And how about the global ontological contingency? Is God an
explanation for the universe, as Swinburne has it? Or is the statement
that God created the universe not explanatory, but rather intended "to
keep our consciousness alive to the mysteries of awesome majesty that
we might otherwise ignore", as Misner (1977, 95) maintains? These
questions are not merely about contingency. They bear on the distinc-
tion made above between a mystical and a prophetical metaphysical
scheme, to which we will return below.
Another question concerns Pannenberg's view of time and the
whole of time. He seems to argue from the primacy of eternity, or the
whole of time, or the infinite, to the primacy of the future (1993b, 43f).
The argument needs for its cogency the idea that it is the future which
makes the whole complete; past and present are already available.
Pannenberg makes the transition from 'whole' to 'future', hence
from the timeless level of description to the description from within
time, for instance when he refers to "future wholeness" (1993b, 43),
242 Willem B Drees
and concludes to a priority of the future (1993b, 43). This seems
unclear and deviating from the physical understanding of time.
If one focusses on the evolutionary picture, one has a past and a
future with respect to any assumed presence. However, past and
future are equally 'not-present'. Completeness is not achieved by
moving towards the future, as with each change in present there is
also a change in the 'not-present'.
Completeness is only achieved, within the context of physical
understanding, by moving to the other level of description, in which
all times are equally present at once. However, this level of description
is atemporal; it is meaningless to consider such wholes as future
wholes; they just are the entities of the theory, and hence of reality as
described by that theory.
I would suggest that it might be possible to maintain the notion of
anticipation of completeness in every present as an expression of the
relation between the two descriptions (cf. Tïpler, 168f). It appears not
in Une with physics to understand the completion as anticipation of
something future. Anticipation becomes an expression for the way the
complete history, past and future with respect to that present, is re-
lated to that present.
A third, more general, cluster of questions concerns the general
nature of the program. Does Pannenberg fit into my division between
a 'mystical' approach to the relation between science and theology
which emphasizes God's presence in the world as described by the
sciences and a 'prophetic' one which emphasizes God's apparent
absence, or at least the ambiguity of the data? Is he, as appears from
his quest for a religious dimension in secular understanding, opting
for an understanding of God as a complement to, and present in,
our reality? This seems to fit with his description of God as the 'all-
determining reality' and with the (apparent?) determinism from the
future, hence the determinism towards a 'happy ending'. That might
be an understanding of God's trustworthiness in promises, and hence
comforting. But how does Pannenberg avoid the theological dangers
of such an approach: the danger to the sharpness of evil, injustice and
imperfection, and hence of judgment, and the danger that we fail to
hear a call for conversion, for doing whatever we can do against injus-
tice and evil?
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Notes
1. In Drees (1990, 136-141) I dealt more extensively with some of these
issues, while offering an analysis of Pannenberg and Tipler. As made clear
there, the apparent similarity with respect to the emphasis on the future
does not survive close scrutiny. Whereas for Pannenberg the future safe-
guards contingency and freedom, for Tipler the future excludes them.
2. 'Global' is cosmological; not restricted to our globe, the Earth.
3. The Hartle-Hawking proposal has been discussed in relation to theologi-
cal ideas by Isham (1988) and Drees (1988; 1990, 51-57).
4. It need not imply finiteness for the universe described by the theory;
finiteness is only required for all possible outcomes of observations.
5. This suggests that observational falsification of such a complete theory
would mean falsification of either the esthetic assumptions or the assump-
tion of mathematical formalizability.
6. For a popular introduction, see Gleick 1987.
7. Hawking used 'strong anthropic principle' for the idea that there are
many universes or regions with different laws and 'weak' for different ini-
tial conditions. But he also used 'strong' in relation to purpose: "the strong
anthropic principle would claim that this whole vast construction exists
simply for our sake" (Hawking 1988, 126). This seems confused. The dis-
tinction between laws and initial conditions is unessential. The distinction
between an anthropic principle working as a selection effect on observa-
tions of laws and conditions and one which expresses a claim of purpose
seems useful, but misses the specific nature of the SAP as well. SAP, as
introduced here following previous authors (Barrow and Tipler 1986),
does not in itself express purpose; the limitation on possible universes
might have another explanation, for instance in the process of origination.
8. This seems the position taken by the cosmologist Roger Penrose. He sug-
gests as an explanation for the isotropy and homogeneity of the universe a
new law of physics which would imply that initial singularities must have
certain properties. As he sees it, the universe is much more homogeneous
than necessary for our existence—and hence an anthropic 'purpose' could
have been realized in a vastly 'cheaper' way (Penrose 1981).
9. There is one sense in which the Hartle-Hawking theory can clearly be
understood as creation from 'nothing'. Ordinary calculations in physics
often assume a state at one moment and laws to calculate the state at
another moment. In such situations we might say that the second state
arises out of the first state. There is in the Hartle-Hawking theory a time-
less level of calculation. In such calculations there is no reference to any
state other than the 'resulting' state. As states are compact, they are the
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only boundary present in the calculation. The theory gives a precise mean-
ing to the notion of 'nothing' as absence from other boundaries in the cal-
culation.
10. The problem seems to express itself technically as the normalization of the
wavefunction of the universe, as well as the interpretation of the resulting
probabilities.
11. Tipler (170-180) seems to deny this distinction between mathematical and
physical existence. Existence is defined by Tïpler as the experience of peo-
ple, perhaps simulated people, of their own existence. The experience of
existence is, as I am willing to concede to Tipler, the same for real existing
entities and for their perfect simulations. The issue is the identity of indis-
cernables as a rule, and the identification of a universe with its perfect sim-
ulation as the case of application. Even if we cannot tell them apart, they
still are different, if imaginary, considered 'from the outside'—and there-
fore they are conceptually different.
12. All the features mentioned in the text appear also in Tipler's article, espe-
cially in his discussion of the aetemitas as exemplified by the Omega-point
(168), and his exclamation 'there is no time!' when he discusses quantum
cosmology (176). Time rums out to be variation along a trajec-tory (176).
The classical trajectories that turn out to have a significant probability cor-
respond to the shortest path in the example about light. One could say
that time is a phenomenological construct.
13. Those who take a purely logical approach to the relation between the-
ology and the natural sciences, like Plantinga (1974) or Brom (1982; 1984),
defend only the logical possibility of combining certain beliefs; they fail to
defend them as reasonable or even compelling.
14. An article by Hans Kippenberg, University of Groningen, on Max Weber's
ideas about the disenchantment (Entzauberung) of the world and possible
rational answers, functioned as the context of discovery.
15. Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell have presented a method in science and
in theology, as well as for the interaction between the two, which is similar
to what I intend (Gerhart and Russell 1984).
16. "Man's chronic need, his infinite dependence, presupposes something
outside himself that is beyond every experience of the world. Man does
not simply respond to the pressure of his surplus of drives by creating for
his longing and awe an imaginary object beyond every possible thing in
the world. Rather, in his infinite dependence he presupposes with every
breath he takes a corresponding, infinite, never ending, otherworldly
being before whom he stands, even if he does not know what to call it....
Our language has the word 'God' for this entity upon which man is
dependent in his infinite striving" (Pannenberg 1970,10).
17. "The aim is to lay theological claim to the human phenomena described in
the anthropological disciplines. To this end, the secular description is ac-
cepted as simply a provisional version of the objective reality, a version that
needs to be expanded and deepened by showing that the anthropological
datum itself contains a further and theologically relevant dimension." (59)
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